We study a model with a durable good subject to periodic obsolescence, and characterize analytically the optimal purchasing policy. The key result is that consumers optimally synchronize new purchases with the innovation cycle. The model simultaneously explains coordinated adoption without invoking network effects and provides a theoretical underpinning for a diffusion curve that features a temporary adoption slowdown. 
Introduction
The arrival of better products at the same price is the major reason for depreciation in markets with technological innovation. Since much of this innovation is incorporated in new durables, modeling obsolescence of durable goods is vital for our understanding of technology adoption. Our goal is to characterize the aggregate demand for durables in a dynamic model of consumer choice that captures the essential distinctions between obsolescence and physical depreciation.
Obsolescence of a durable occurs with mere passage of time, typically because superior substitutes become available at the same price. By contrast, physical depreciation depends on utilization intensity (or the good's decay with physical age) specific to an individual unit. Thus obsolescence and utilization are two distinct depreciation channels. Their aggregate effects are distinct as well: while physical depreciation is idiosyncratic and its aggregate effects are likely smooth, obsolescence caused by innovation affects all durables within a market. Moreover, technological events that cause obsolescence may be predictable: major innovation episodes can be anticipated, especially when the introduction of new products is periodic. For some goods, such as automobiles, redesigned models do appear periodically, every 4 or 5 years. Even when obsolescence is not deterministic, typically, obsolescence episodes are not independent events either. Innovation processes naturally have hazard rates that are negligible immediately after an innovation; after all, no one expects a new generation of products to appear immediately after the introduction of a new model. We therefore think that an innovation process with predictable, discrete jumps captures the main features of obsolescence that we want to emphasize. 2 The analysis of this paper builds on the basic idea that consumer expectations about the timing of future innovations affect the current purchasing behavior. 3 Suppose that individual units are expected to depreciate abruptly at some future date. Consumers who purchase their 2 In reality, obsolescence patterns have both discrete and continuous elements, but markets where discrete obsolescence is likely to be important are commonplace. The literature typically associates periodic obsolescence with a monopolistic producer whose timing of product introduction is a strategic variable (e.g. Swan, 1972 , Rust,1986 , Fishman and Rob, 2000 . Our focus is on a different set of markets, where major innovations affect all the producers, but they are infrequent due to technological constraints rather than strategic reasons. These markets include several (overlapping) categories. (1) Markets where new products have a different format or standard. Format switching is typical for data recording or storage devices, such as disk drives, camcorders and digital cameras. (2) Goods that depend on a "bottleneck" (lagging) technology. For example, power supply has been a constraining factor in adding new features to many portable electronic devices. (3) Markets where technological constraints are imposed by periodically changing government regulation, such as cellular communications. 3 The idea of expectations-driven demand is similar in spirit to frameworks featuring deterministic output cycles: Shleifer (1986) and Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2003) demonstrated how coordination of innovation dates across producers can arise from agents' rational expectations about the timing of economic booms and give rise to aggregate deterministic output cycles. durables just before this date will enjoy a lower service flow than those who buy soon after. Hence, consumers have an incentive to buy a durable only when the design is sufficiently new and is not about to change soon. Thus demand for new durables should drop some time prior to the dates when the new models become available. These anticipatory drops in demand have been noted for DVD players (Dranove and Gandal, 2003 ) and large-screen TVs (Shapiro and Varian, 1999, p. 15) . In automobiles, regular timing of model year changes induces strong seasonal fluctuations of auto sales (Cooper and Haltiwanger, 1993 a, b) .
We study an economy with a durable and a non-durable good and a large number of heterogenous consumers. The durable good in our model represents a fairly narrow consumption category, hence the assumption that innovation is periodic seems appropriate. Then the non-durable category encompasses all options of deriving utility from expenditure outside of the durable market. The main feature that makes our framework distinct from a standard ( ) model of durable replacement is the periodic (rather than continuous) arrival of better models of the durable. The periodic nature of model changes introduces a mixture of discrete (e.g. whether to buy the current model or wait for the next one) and continuous (e.g. when to buy the current model) choice variables and makes the replacement problem difficult to analyze. Nevertheless, we develop a special solution methodology that does not rely on marginal conditions and are able to solve analytically for the optimal consumption paths of individuals.
Our basic model features periodic innovation dates that are perfectly anticipated. One key property of optimal solution is the no-delay result (Theorem 2): all consumers who purchase a particular model of the durable find it optimal to do so simultaneously, at the time when this model is first introduced. The timing of purchases depends on the interest rate and the (endogenous) marginal utility of wealth. If a consumer is buying the current model of the durable, and the interest rate is zero, then clearly she is better off buying without delay and getting the highest possible service flow from the new model. However, as the interest rate increases, consumers may prefer buying in the middle of the design cycle despite the loss of service flow. We show that purchasing a durable in the middle of the design cycle is never optimal, because any consumer can be made better off by either buying the current model without delay or by buying some future model without delay.
Two unique implications derive from the no-delay result. First, it gives rise to a new mechanism for demand coordination that is not dependent on network effects, externalities or strategic complementarities. Previous literature that sought to understand simultaneous technology adoption stressed a different coordination mechanism based on positive externalities, such as information spillovers (Bannerjee, 1992) , learning by doing (Jovanovic and Lach, 1989 ) and consumption externalities (Farrell and Saloner, 1985) . The policy implica-tions of the two mechanisms are distinct: adoption timing in our model is efficient, whereas in a setting with externalities it is inefficiently slow. 4 Second, the coordination mechanism that we identify in the basic model allows more detailed understanding of empirical technology diffusion curves. The basic argument can be generalized to a setting where model arrival dates are random, but the innovation hazard rate is negligible immediately after a new model introduction. When the hazard rate is initially negligible, consumers who purchase the durable early enjoy a longer time without obsolescence. Consumers then optimally separate themselves into two groups: early adopters who act (almost) immediately and late adopters who choose to purchase the good with a long delay. Early adopters purchase the good at a higher price, but are less exposed to the risk of obsolescence. By contrast, late adopters, who face a higher risk of obsolescence, find it optimal to wait until the price of the good falls. Since all consumers decide to act either early or late, no one purchases the good in the middle of its design cycle, and its diffusion curve reaches a temporary "plateau". 5 Recent empirical results on diffusion curves are generally consistent with diffusion slowdown after the initial burst in demand. For example, Comin et al. (2006) outline the general characteristics of technology adoption patterns and conclude that "once the intensive margin is measured, technologies do not diffuse in a logistic way". In particular, for many technologies, the initial burst of adoption activity is followed by a slowdown in the rate of diffusion (see also Comin and Hobijn (2010, Figures 2, 3) ). This is the opposite of the S-shape, or logistic, diffusion pattern where the adoption rate is highest in the middle of the diffusion process.
Predictable obsolescence patterns have dramatic effects on purchase timing: the no-delay property, for instance, restricts the relevant choices of durable purchase dates to be discrete. This gives rise to a non-standard consumption smoothing mechanism: some consumers prefer a fixed (discrete) replacement frequency, while others alternate between two discrete holding periods from time to time. For the latter group, optimality requires that the marginal utility of wealth (and the non-durable consumption as well) be independent of purchase timing choices or the wealth level. Interestingly, if such consumers receive an unexpected windfall, they will not change their non-durable consumption but will instead spend the entire amount of additional wealth on future durable purchases. The last result is reminiscent of what Leahy and Zeira (2005) term "insulation effect": the windfall is entirely absorbed by changes in durable purchase timing, and the non-durable consumption is thus insulated from the wealth shock. The insulation effect is not universal in our model, however. The other group of consumers who optimally use a fixed holding frequency will instead spend the entire windfall on non-durable consumption and not change their durable purchase timing.
Our work complements two macroeconomic literatures that study obsolescence and integrates their previously separate sets of assumptions on the innovation process. One such strand of literature (see Boucekkine et al., 2011 for a comprehensive literature review) is macroeconomic models that derive from the vintage capital framework of Solow, 1960 . The key assumption shared with our model is innovation embodied in durable goods. Another strand of related literature is Schumpeterian models of creative destruction, particularly frameworks that follow the seminal quality ladder model (Grossman and Helpman, 1991) . The shared feature with our model is the sector-level production technology subject to repeated, abrupt obsolescence. There is no embodiment in the quality ladder framework, however: capital is general rather than technology-specific. The distinct implications in our model are largely due to the combination of the previously separate embodiment and creative destruction assumptions. Our analysis provides a detailed description of the consumer side of the economy in the presence of lumpy durable goods, and as such it is complementary to the macroeconomic models of obsolescence that focus on the production side.
Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 separately solves the special case of the optimal consumption problem for durables and non-durables. Section 4 characterizes the general case solution. Section 5 discusses the aggregate implications of our main results in the context of innovation driven by general purpose technologies. In Section 6 we analyze the model with stochastic innovation and derive the diffusion curve. Section 7 concludes.
Model
We consider a dynamic economy with two goods, a durable and a non-durable good, and a continuum of agents that differ in their permanent income  ∈ £  ¤ . Incomes are given exogenously, and they stay constant over time.
Goods, technology and preferences: The durable good is indivisible and is produced by a constant returns to scale technology that uses  0 units of the non-durable good for each unit of the durable good. New durables (new models) are introduced regularly into the market at times  ∈ N = {0 1   }. Without loss of generality, we have normalized to 1 the length of a design cycle. We refer to the durable introduced at time  as "model  ". Obsolescence is the only form of depreciation in our model. 6 Suppose that a model  ≥ 0 provides a constant service flow   =   for the duration of its useful life, in the interval
, where  is a positive integer. In other words, the durable becomes useless when it falls  or more models behind the state-of-the-art good. A useless durable provides service flow equal to 1. Notice that  +  acts as an "expiration date" for any durable of model  , regardless of whether it was produced at date  or some later date   . The expiration date assumption has both technical and substantive content. Technically, our solution methodology requires an upper bound on the holding time for the durable good, and the expiration date is a simple way to impose such a bound (see, in particular, Theorem 1). Substantively, the assumption derives from the Schumpeterian concept of innovation and states that recurring arrivals of superior models eventually cause creative destruction (here, every  generations of products). This assumption captures the fact that the useful life of many durables is limited not by the extent of physical wear and tear, but by eventual arrival of far superior models. 7 For example, a sundial can stay physically functional indefinitely, but it might fall into disuse when consumers gain access to a quartz watch. In this example, the arrival date of a quartz watch acts as the expiration date for the sundial. Consumers: Consumers are infinitely-lived and have a (common) discount rate  and a (common) separable flow utility function ( ) = ln   + (), where  is the durable good model and  is the consumption flow for the non-durable (note that a useless durable provides utility of zero). Durable goods are perfect substitutes and each agent consumes at most one unit (additional units provide no utility). We think of the non-durable good as money for the consumption of other goods, and of  as an indirect utility function. We assume that
The consumers can borrow and lend, but there are no secondary markets for used durables (the latter assumption is relaxed in Section 4.2).
Prices: Since the production technology is CRS, the price ratio of the durable good to the non-durable good is equal to a constant  0 at all times. We will assume that the interest rate is fixed and equal to the discount rate: () =  for all  ≥ 0. We therefore perform a partial equilibrium analysis. We think of the market for durables as being a small part of the aggregate economy and hence ignore the effect of durable demand on the interest rate. Our choice of interest rate is consistent with stationary equilibria. In a general equilibrium model where income (resource) flow and production technology are constant over time, a stationary equilibrium would imply a constant interest rate equal to the discount rate. If () and () denote, respectively, the prices of the non-durable and durable goods at time , our assumption of a constant interest rate implies that () =  − and () =  0 () for all  ≥ 0, where we have normalized so that (0) = 1. Define the total discount rate for one period as
Equivalent utility function The model features a time trend in durable quality, and it is convenient to formulate an equivalent problem in detrended variables. Let  = {0   } denote the technological age of a durable good, i.e. the number of new models introduced since it was produced. Because all useless goods are the same, we will make no distinction between durables whose technological age exceeds  , so all of them have  =  . At time , the state-of-the-art model is bc, where bc is the largest integer less than or equal to .
Model bc delivers flow utility bc, and a model of age  provides utility  (bc − ). The utility differential between model age  and the state-of-the-art model depends only on  (and not on ) and equals −. Accordingly, we can define a normalized 8 utility differential
so that   =  0 − . Proposition 1 below states that consumer's ranking of different consumption paths depends only on the utility of her durable compared to the state-of the-art model. Proposition 1: Let  () and  () be two measurable functions representing the consumption trajectory of a consumer (where () is the technological age of the durable being consumed at time ). Then, the discounted lifetime utility for this trajectory is
where  is a constant and
Proof: See Appendix.
For the rest of the paper, we will use the equivalent utility function in (2) and refer to and   simply as "utility". 9 It is easy to see that any delay in purchasing the current model reduces its discounted utility. Suppose that a new model  is purchased at date  + ,  periods after it first appeared. Let  be the holding time for the durable, and let  + denote the total discounted utility of a model held from age  until age  + :
The utility of the durable   drops at pre-determined dates { + 1  + 2   +  } that are independent of , hence and delay reduces utility:  +   0 , all   0. In other words, technological aging occurs with mere passage of time, so the model purchased with a delay experiences some depreciation even before it is put to use. This property is specific to obsolescence: if depreciation were instead a result of physical wear alone, there would be no depreciation before use, and consumers could enjoy the full utility  0 from any new model regardless of its purchase date.
Consumer problem Given her initial state ( 0  ), where  0 ∈ {1      } is the age of her endowed durable and  is her total wealth, a consumer chooses a sequence of durable purchase dates and a non-durable consumption path to maximize her discounted lifetime utility,  ( ), subject to a lifetime budget constraint. An agent's current wealth, , is equal to her initial assets plus the present discounted value of future earnings .
Since the agent's utility is additively separable, the optimal consumption problem can be solved in two stages. First, choose how to divide the wealth into budgets  −  and  that will be used in nondurable and durable consumption. Second, given budgets  −  and , select optimal consumption schedules for the nondurable and durable goods.
When () ≡ , the optimal nondurable consumption is constant over time. Indeed, the (necessary and sufficient) first-order condition for non-durable consumption is in this case
where   0 is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint.
This implies that () = (0) for all   0.
10
Let() be the discounted non-durable consumption utility over one period (of length 1) in which a consumer spends optimally a budget  for the period. Budget  affords the 9 The main results in this paper do not depend on   being linear in . The analysis of the model is unchanged if the consumer's utility function is of the form (2) and {  } is any decreasing sequence with   = 0.
10 When   , the optimal  () is falling in . In this case, a consumer optimally front-loads his consumption and finances it by borrowing against his future income early in life. Similarly, he will replace durables more frequently early on. The opposite would occur when   : consumers will choose to postpone consumption and accumulate savings to finance it. constant instantaneous consumption flow , where  = (1 − ). Accordingly,
Given a total budget − for nondurable, the consumer optimally spends  = ( − ) (1−) per period in nondurables and gets a total discounted utility of()(1 − ). Note that
Let   () denote the optimal durable consumption utility of a consumer that is endowed with a good of age  and spends a total budget  on durables. Then the budget allocation problem of an agent with initial state ( ) is
In Section 4, we explicitly construct the functions   ,  ∈ {1      } and obtain the full solution for problem (4) .
Solution methodology Given a budget , solving for the optimal durable consumption path  () requires finding a sequence of dates {  } when the durable is replaced. This is difficult because the utility of the durable,  () , jumps discontinuously every time the durable is replaced or a new model arrives. Thus the optimal {  } is not characterized by standard marginal conditions. To tackle this non-standard problem, we first restrict attention to a class of feasible durable purchasing rules (that we call no-delay policies) where the consumer only buys new durables at dates   ∈ N when new models appear. We are able to characterize the best no-delay policy analytically, as a solution to an integer programming problem (see Theorem 1) . We then show that the the best no-delay policy is also optimal for the problem where the consumer can make durable purchases at any time   ∈ R + (see Theorem 2) . The next section illustrates the steps involved in constructing the best no-delay policy for the special case  = 1. Section 4 then goes on to describe our main results for the general case   1.
Special case  = 1
We start with an example that illustrates why the optimal policy might belong to the nodelay class. Next, we show how to construct the best no-delay policy (that, in the end, is going to coincide with the optimal policy) for  = 1, and point out the features of the optimal policy that are common with the general case solution derived in Section 4.
Assume that  ∈ (12 1) and  = 1. Hence, a new model provides a constant utility  0  0 during its first period, and subsequently a utility of 0. Consider a consumer that has a budget  for durable consumption and a good of age  0 = 1. If the consumer replaces the durable every period as soon as the new models arrive, including period 0, she spends  0 (1 − ), and gets a constant flow utility of  0 and a lifetime discounted utility of  0 . If she skips model  = 0 instead and purchases every subsequent model, she spends  0 (1−) and obtains a total utility of  0 . Now compare two different ways of spending a budget
With a budget , consumer cannot replace the durable every period, but can afford the following two durable purchasing policies. Policy A is to make the initial purchase of the durable with a delay  ∈ (0 1) in period 0 and then replace the good every period as soon as new models arrive. The delay is exactly such that policy A spends budget :
. Policy B instead purchases a new model in period 0 without delay and then skips a (possibly infinite) sequence of future models {  } such that
That is, the total budget savings from skipping future models amount to  0 ¡ 1 −  − ¢ . Therefore, policy A and policy B spend exactly the same budget . However, policy B has higher total utility:
Total utility of policy B is higher because any delay in purchasing the current model reduces its lifetime service flow without generating a corresponding savings in budget. Indeed, a consumer who buys model  without delay spends  0   and obtains the present value of
Her utility per dollar spent on durables is therefore
, independent of  . When the consumer buys the same model with a delay , she spends  −  0   and obtains a present value of    0
. In this case, her utility per dollar is
. In the extreme case when the consumer buys model  one instant before the next model is introduced (so  = 1), the utility per dollar is 0. The example suggests that policies with delays can be dominated with no-delay policies spending the same budget. This argument is going to be formalized and generalized in Theorem 2. Now construct the best no-delay policy for any . Let {  } be a sequence of models purchased with no delays. The value and budget of any such no-delay policy can be represented as
Combining the above expressions and noting that maximum attainable durable utility is
The optimal decision rule  * 1 () ∈ {0 1} specifies whether to replace ( = 1) the  = 1 good or keep it ( = 0) for one more period. The decision rule  * 1 () can be obtained as a solution to the Bellman equation
Equation ( . When    0 , it is not feasible to replace the good, so
, the consumer is indifferent between keeping and replacing:  = {0 1}.
11 This means that there is more than one policy {  } that can spend a budget  in the indifference range, but all such policies have the same value
, the optimal decision is to replace ( = 1). Theorem 1 formally proves that the value function (5) solves (6) and generalizes the argument for   1.
To summarize, consumers who can afford replacing the good every period ( ≥
optimally do so. We say that they are following a 1-fixed rule. This terminology means they maintain a fixed holding cycle of 1 period. By contrast, consumers with  
follow what we call a 1-flexible rule. They hold each durable for at least one period and can skip one or more models between subsequent replacements. The durable replacement frequency is therefore irregular. To illustrate, suppose that the starting budget is 0     0 , so it is optimal to skip the first model. Each period the new model is skipped, the budget grows by a factor 1  . Eventually, the budget grows enough to exceed  0 and make it (weakly) optimal to purchase the first new model
The new purchase reduces the budget to
next period, and the skipping phase starts again. Notice that each time the flexible rule consumer revisits the state  = 1, her current  is different (as it depends on past replacement history). Consequently, the intervals between replacements are irregular, and the demand for new goods by flexible rule consumers follows a seemingly erratic, rather than periodic, pattern.
The optimal value function obtained in (6) makes it easy to solve the budget allocation problem (4) for the special case  = 1:
Consumers following the 1-flexible rule choose a budget  ∈ ³ 0
and for them problem (7) has an interior solution  * 1 () obeying the first order condition
Hence every 1-flexible rule consumer has the same non-durable consumption level
irrespective of their . Consumers whose wealth is not enough to afford  1 choose a corner solution with  = 0. At the other end of the wealth interval, consumers whose wealth can afford a durable budget . Summarizing, optimal non-durable consumption is a piecewise linear function
The analysis of the special case informs the solution methodology for the general case, as the no-delay replacement policies and the associated fixed and flexible rules also arise when   1.
General case
We solve problem (4) in the general case   1 using a guess-and-verify strategy. Based on the analysis in Section 3, we guess that the optimal durable purchasing policy belongs to a class of no-delay policies with   ∈ N for any . Theorem 1 derives the optimal value function within the restricted class of no-delay policies. Theorem 2 verifies that the unrestricted optimal policy indeed belongs to the no-delay class. In other words, it turns out that Theorem 1 fully characterizes the solution to the durable replacement problem.
No-delay optimal policy We now construct the optimal value function   () for the general case   1. The main difference from the special case is that consumers can replace their goods before they reach age  . The optimal solution is going to feature  distinct fixed rules with holding periods  ∈ {1   } and  distinct flexible rules where consumers episodically switch between holding periods  and  + 1.
A no-delay durable purchasing policy is a sequence of decisions  = {  } ≥0 , where   = 1 if the consumer buys a new unit in period  and   = 0 if she keeps the old unit. To make notation more compact, define  ⊕  = min{ +   } and  ª  = max{ −  0} for any   ∈ N. Given an initial durable of age , a purchasing policy determines the age of the durable consumed in every period  ≥ 0 recursively as follows:
The total discounted utility from the consumption of a durable of age  over one period is  ≡   . Hence, the optimization problem of an agent that initially has a good of age  and durable budget  is
After introducing some additional notation, we are able to solve the integer programming problem above using a direct geometric argument.
Definition: For each  = 1      , a policy  that replaces the durable every time it reaches age  is called an -fixed rule. That is,  is an -fixed rule if for all ,   = 1 if and only if  −1 ≥  − 1. A ( + 1)-fixed rule is to never replace the durable:
The total utility derived from an -fixed rule depends on the initial age  of the durable the consumer is endowed with. Let   denote the total discounted utility from holding a durable from age  until age : Assume that  =  and for an arbitrary purchasing policy , group purchases by their "replacement age". That is, for each  = 1      , let   be the purchase dates of all durables that are replaced at age . Compute the weight
Roughly, the weight   corresponds to the fraction of purchases of durables that are later replaced at age . For example, if the policy is an -fixed rule with    + 1, then   contains all the periods  where   = 1, so that   = 1 and   = 0 for all  6 = . Let ( ) denote the budget and value of policy . It turns out that:
Since the weights   are nonnegative and add up to 1, the right-hand side is a convex combination of the two-dimensional points
=1 . That is, the point ( ) must be in the convex hull of
=1 , as depicted in Figure 2 . Note that the upper frontier of this set coincides with the graph of the posited optimal value function   . Hence,  ≤   (). As we argue next, the upper bound   () is attained by a particular type of flexible rule.
Suppose  is such that  ∈ [ +1    ], and let  * be a policy that replaces durables at age  or  + 1 only. Such a policy is called an -flexible rule. Its corresponding weights satisfy  *  = 0 for all   ∈ {  + 1}. By appropriately choosing the periods when durables of age  or age  + 1 are replaced, we can also ensure that  =  *    +  * +1  +1 (as we explain later, this is always possible provided that  is sufficiently large). Then, the value of  * is  *
That is,  * is optimal for the budget .
For an arbitrary  now, let   and   denote the cost and the value of following the -fixed rule when the endowed durable is of age . Then
Rules that replace goods more frequently require bigger budgets and have higher values. Hence     +1 and     +1 . Similar to   , the graph of the optimal value function   is obtained by joining the adjacent points ( +1   +1 ) and (     ) (1 ≤  ≤  ) with straight lines (see Theorem 1 below). Figure 2 (right frame) presents simultaneously the optimal value functions  1 ,  2 and  3 for the case when  = 3.
Definition: Let 1 ≤  ≤  − 1 and  ≥ 0. A policy  is an ( )-flexible rule if it replaces durables only when they are of age  or age  + 1 and spends the budget  exactly. If  is an ( )-flexible rule then for all ,   = 1 implies that  −1 ∈ { − 1 }.
Since an ( )-flexible rule sometimes replaces goods at age , and sometimes at age  + 1, it costs more than an ( + 1)-fixed rule but less than an -fixed rule. Hence, when the endowed good is of age ,  must be in the interval [ +1    ]. The -fixed and the (+1)-fixed rules are both special cases of the ( )-flexible rule for  =   and  =  +1 , respectively.
For 1 ≤   ≤  , let   be the slope of   in the interval ( +1    ):
Note that   is independent of  and it is easy to check that      −1  · · ·   1  0, and therefore   is indeed a concave function.
where  = 12 for  = 1 and  is a (unique) positive root of
and for any budget  ≥ 0, a corresponding optimal purchasing policy is an ( )-flexible rule, where  is such that  ∈ [ +1    ] (when  =   , this policy coincides with the -fixed rule). More precisely, the optimal purchasing policy is given by
Proof: See Appendix. in Section 3. This assumption guarantees that it is feasible to spend any budget  ∈ [ +1    ] by following an ( )-flexible rule, and this property is essential for (9) to represent the optimal value function. To understand why, consider an -flexible consumer in state  =  when she is about to replace the durable. Focus, in particular, on the budget  in the indifference region for  *  () in (10),
When the budget falls in the indifference region, the optimal decision rule  *  () allows the consumer to either keep or replace the durable. If she keeps the good  =  now, she would replace it for sure at age  + 1 and will therefore revisit the state  =  in the next  + 1 periods with a durable budget
Similarly, if the consumer replaces the good now (at age ), she is going to revisit the state  =  in the next  periods with a budget  00 = 
We can see that consumer with budget cannot follow the prescribed -flexible rule in the future, because both   = 0 and   = 1 decisions take her outside of the -flexible rule budget set the very next time she revisits the state  = . In other words, when (8) is violated, there is no -flexible rule that can spend a budget such as, and the optimal value function is no longer given by (9) . Assumption (8) puts an lower bound on the discount rate for one period. For a fixed annual interest rate , the discount rate  corresponds to period length of  =
on the useful lifetime. For  = 002, a typical value used in most literature on consumer intertemporal choice,  is between 34.6 and 48.1 years, depending on  . In most high-innovation markets where our model is plausibly applicable, durables become completely obsolete long before age 35. Hence assumption (8) does not seem restrictive for empirically relevant parameter values.
We now proceed with to establish the optimality of no-delay policies within the broader class of all feasible durable replacement rules. The general durable replacement policy is a sequence of pairs { 0     }, where  0  is the model number and   ∈ [0 1) is the "delay" of the -th purchase, so the time of the -th purchase is  0  +   . The following theorem states that it is optimal to set   = 0 for all .
Theorem 2: For each  = 1      , the optimal value function   () is that given by (9) in Theorem 1. For any budget  ≥ 0, the corresponding optimal purchasing policy
We now present a sketch of the proof for Theorem 2. Suppose an agent replaces her durable of age  with delay in the current period. Consider the costs and benefits from this delay, given that there are no delays in the future. If the consumer increases the delay of the replacement by , she forgoes service flow ( 0 −   )  but increases her wealth by  0 , the amount of interest saved by purchasing the good later. Theorem 1 implies that the marginal utility of wealth for someone who follows an -flexible rule is less than equal to   . Simple algebra shows that
so the gain from delay is less than the corresponding loss of service. The proof of the theorem generalizes this argument by showing that similar reasoning applies when more than one durable purchase is delayed. An arbitrary policy with delays can be modified recursively by eliminating one delay at a time while maintaining the same budget and improving its value.
Physical depreciation The results of Theorems 1 and 2 generalize in a straightforward fashion if we allow deterministic physical depreciation within a period. Suppose that the service flow from the good of age  ≥ 1 equals   · ∆ (), where  ∈ [0 1] is the time elapsed since the beginning of the current period and ∆ (·) is a decreasing function that describes physical depreciation during a period. The amount of physical depreciation depends on the time elapsed since the date of purchase. To capture this, assume that for  = 0 the service flow from the durable purchased at time
o guarantee that the service flow from the durable is non-increasing. As before, define the average service flow per period
By construction,  is a non-increasing sequence, so Theorem 1 holds. To see if Theorem 2 will hold, consider costs and benefits of a single delay. The service flow forgone from delaying a durable purchase by  now depends on  and equals
That is, since the current durable experiences physical depreciation, the forgone service flow rises with delay and is always greater than ( 0 −   ) . Hence, incentives to replace durables without delay (inequality (11)) are strengthened
and Theorem 2 extends to the case with physical depreciation.
Optimal budget allocation
We now solve the budget allocation problem (4) . Consider an agent with wealth  and a durable of age . As we argued before, if the agent allocates a budget  for durable consumption, then she optimally spends  = (1 − )( − ) per period in non-durables.
The agent should pick  so as to equate the marginal utilities of durable 12 and non-durable Figure 3 depicts the marginal utility of durable consumption (the falling step-function because   is a concave piecewise linear function) and the marginal utility of consumption as functions of  (for given values of  and ).
In the left panel of Figure 3 , 0 ((1−)( −)) crosses  0  () at a point of discontinuity. In the figure, the optimal durable budget equals   and the corresponding durable purchasing policy is the -fixed rule. Now decrease  by a small amount. The graph of 0 ((1−)(−)) will shift to the left, but it will still cross  0  at  =   . In other words, there is an interval of wealths  for which it is optimal to follow the -fixed rule from the state ( ). If we further decrease , 0 will eventually cross  0  at a point where  0  is flat and equal to   . This is the case when it is optimal to choose a budget corresponding to an -flexible rule and pick the non-durable budget   , where 0 (  ) =   . Hence, there is also an interval of wealths  for which it is optimal to follow the -flexible rule and spend   in non-durables every period. For that range of wealths, the optimal non-durable budget remains constant and variations of wealth affect the durable consumption path only (higher wealth affords replacing durables at age  more frequently, while lower wealth requires replacing durables at age  + 1 more often). In contrast, when a fixed rule is optimal, a higher wealth leads to a higher level of non-durable consumption. For a fixed , if  varies continuously from infinity to zero, the intersection of Figure 3 moves monotonically to the left and maps out the optimal decision rule (as a function of ). The wealthiest consumers use a 1-fixed rule. Next comes a group of consumers that follow a 1-flexible rule, and then a group that follows the 2-fixed rule, and so on. The intervals of wealth where agents follow fixed rules are interlaced with the intervals of wealth where they follow flexible rules. The bounds of these intervals can be computed explicitly. Let
be the wealth required to follow the -fixed rule and spend a constant non-durable budget  per period when the initial durable is of age . The wealthiest agent that follows the -flexible rule replaces her durable every  periods and consumes   . Hence her wealth is   (  ). The poorest agent that follows the ( − 1)-flexible rule also replaces her durable 12 The piecewise linear function   is not differentiable at the budgets   , but since   is concave, it has a well defined interval of subgradients at   , which, with abuse of notation, we still denote by
every  periods but consumes  −1    , so that her wealth is   ( −1 )    (  ). In between, there are consumers with wealth  ∈ [  (  )   ( −1 )] that follow the -fixed rule. Each one spends the same durable budget   and the non-durable budget per period
A consumer with more wealth than  11 ( 1 ) = ( 1 +  0 )(1 − ) will replace her durable every period and spend more than  1 per period in non-durables. We will assume that  ≥  11 ( 1 ), and define = and  0 = (1 − ) −  0 . Similarly, a consumer with less wealth than   (1 − ) will spend all her wealth in non-durable consumption. We will assume that  ≤   (1 − ), and define  =  and   +1 = (1 − ).
We can also express the optimal purchasing policy (10), stated in Theorem 1, as a function of wealth (and with abuse of notation denote this function by the same symbol  *  ). The following theorem states these results formally.
Over time, a consumer that follows an -fixed rule has a constant holding time  and revisits the same points in the state space ( ) every  periods. her wealth trajectory is cyclical. While the consumer keeps the current good, both  and  increase, as the consumer "saves" for the next purchase. When the new durable is purchased, both  and  go down, and the holding cycle starts again.
The time path for wealth of a consumer that follows an -flexible rule is more erratic. Usually, her wealth trajectory is not cyclical: each time the durable is of age , she has a different wealth level (recall the discussion in Section 3). Thus, the agent will switch replacement frequencies in a seemingly erratic pattern, as each time that she revisits the state  = , her wealth level  falls into a different place on the interval
Secondary markets
Many durable goods have active resale markets, and it is informative to investigate how opening the used goods market affects our main results. We start with the simplest case  = 1. The used market might potentially play a role in allocating used goods with lower service flows to less affluent consumers. Accordingly, for the purposes of this section, we assume that the durable experiences physical depreciation, as in (12) . The durable of age  ∈ [0 1] provides instantaneous utility  0 ∆ (). Depending on the range of ∆ (), there may be a continuum of used goods with distinct instantaneous utilities in the range [0  0 ]. We assume that there are no trading frictions, allowing consumers to realize any positive gains from trade in the used market.
Before stating results formally, we develop some relevant intuitions. When  = 1, there are just two classes of consumers: the 1-fixed rule class and the 1-flexible rule class. Think in terms of an efficient allocation of used goods across consumers. It is not efficient to allocate used goods to 1-fixed rule consumers, because they desire to further increase their durable consumption, but are constrained by the maximum attainable durable utility
This leaves the 1-flexible rule consumers as the only potential used good buyers. Trades within the flexible rule class are a wash, because all members of this group have identical marginal utilities of wealth, ( 1 ) =  1 , despite having different . Alternatively, 1-flexible class could be induced to buy used goods from the 1-fixed class at sufficiently low prices. However, any price acceptable by the buyers will be too low to be also acceptable by the sellers. Hence, there are no gains from trade, and the used market is redundant. Formally, we have Proposition 2 Let  = 1 and let the service flow from the durable of age  ∈ [0 1] be given by  0 ∆ (). Then, the gains from trade in the used market are at most zero.
Proposition 2 shows that the used market is redundant for  = 1, even if assumed physical depreciation generates a continuum of distinct used goods. In the special case, there is no resale because the 1-fixed rule consumers cannot be induced to sell their durables until age 1, and everyone else has zero gains from trade.
The main argument in Proposition 2 generalizes to the case when   1. It is inefficient for 1-fixed rule consumers to sell used goods until they reach age 1, because doing so will reduce their utility from the durables and make it necessary to spend even more on nondurables that have low marginal utility 0 () ≤  1 to begin with. Hence successive cohorts of 1-period old goods will come on the market at dates  ∈ N. Accordingly, the potential buyers of these 1-period old used goods have an incentive to time their own resale decisions with dates  and offer their old units for sale at the same time. Accordingly, we expect that this mechanism will generate supply spikes for multiple older vintages of used goods precisely at dates  when 1-fixed rule consumers choose to trade. Beyond this, an analytical characterization of the used market equilibrium for   1 becomes difficult because of the combinatorics associated with a large number of distinct replacement rules that can potentially be part of equilibrium. Nevertheless, the above argument demonstrates why demand for new goods may remain periodic even when the used markets have active trade.
Aggregate Implications
The suitability of our model for analyzing aggregate phenomena outside of a narrow sector depends on the assumptions we are willing to make on the innovation process underlying the introductions of better products. If the durable good categories are numerous and innovations are uncorrelated across categories, sectoral demand fluctuations will wash out in the aggregate. The above description of innovation is plausible and analytically convenient, but it is not complete: historians studying creative destruction point out that drastic innovations are important drivers of progress, and that some of these innovations are radical enough to make an aggregate impact (e.g. Generally, any technology with wide applicability could induce nearly simultaneous innovations across multiple sectors and make a model like ours useful for studying demand at higher levels of aggregation. Battery technology might be one recent example. Power supply has been a constraint in adding features to portable devices across multiple categories, and also a major factor affecting development of new propulsion technologies in transportation. Hence a substantial improvement in battery energy density may simultaneously bring about smart phones, lightweight power tools and long-range electric cars.
Consumption response to a change in wealth
Durable and non-durable consumption show differential response to changes in wealth. Fixed rule consumers have a fixed durable budget and a positive marginal propensity to consume non-durables (see Figure 3) . Therefore, if any such consumer receives windfall income, she will spend it all on non-durable consumption. By contrast, flexible rule consumers have a zero marginal propensity to consume non-durables and a variable durable budget. 13 They will save all of their windfall to make future durable purchases and will not change their nondurable consumption. Leahy and Zeira, 2005 call this the "insulation effect": the windfall is entirely absorbed by changes in durable purchase timing, and the non-durable consumption is thus insulated from the wealth shock. The insulation effect highlights durable purchase timing as a potentially important propagation channel for income and wealth shocks. Interestingly, comparisons between our model and Leahy and Zeira, 2005 reveal that the underlying mechanisms for consumption insulation are very different. In both models, the insulation effect arises because the agent's marginal utility of wealth is independent of purchase timing 14 (for -flexible rule consumers it is constant and equal to   , for example). In our model, the insulation effect is a consequence of restricted choices of purchase timing: flexible rules arise precisely because it is optimal to adjust holding periods for the durable only in discrete increments. In Leahy and Zeira, by contrast, the insulation effect obtains mostly due to unrestricted purchase timing, but restricted choice of the holding period for the durable.
Volatility of durable consumption
It is well-known that aggregate durable consumption is more volatile than aggregate nondurable consumption. Our model points out a reason why the demand for durables may exhibit strong fluctuations even in the absence of income or wealth shocks. In the deterministic version of the model, the time series volatility of durable and non-durable expenditure are at the opposite extremes. That is, the standard deviation of the growth rate of durable expenditure is large, because durable purchases exhibit spikes at discrete dates. Since the non-durable consumption is constant, the standard deviation of its growth rate is zero. In reality, consumers may experience idiosyncratic shocks to their permanent income or to the service flow from their current durable. In an richer environment with idiosyncratic shocks, consumers cannot perfectly plan ahead all their durable purchases, and some purchases will be made in the middle of the cycle. We expect that large idiosyncratic shocks will moderate the volatility of durable expenditure, while making the volatility of non-durable consumption positive. The distinct implication of our model is that higher income variance (e.g. Haider, 2001 ) can have opposite effects on the volatility of durables and non-durables: it can lower the volatility of durable demand while increasing the variance of non-durable consumption.
Random Period Length
In this section, we solve the durable replacement problem with random arrival times with the focus on the "diffusion curve" (the number of users of the new model as a function of time since its introduction). In our basic framework with certainty, the consumers can perfectly predict when new models will arrive to the market. The diffusion of every new model of the durable is therefore instantaneous (L-shaped): all consumers who purchase model  do so simultaneously at time  . By contrast, in a model with Poisson arrivals, the hazard rate of model introduction stays constant, and the expected service flow of a new durable is independent of the time of purchase. Therefore, consumers have no incentive to time their purchases near the model introduction dates. The diffusion of the new model will happen with inertia, with the shape of diffusion curve determined by the distribution of wealth.
We adopt a framework that combines these two extreme cases. We assume that the development times of new models are i. i. d. random variables distributed on [ ∞), where  ≥ 0 is the minimum gestation period. If  is the time it takes to develop and introduce a new model into the market, then  −  has an exponential distribution with parameter . Thus, the average arrival time is  + 1. Note that our deterministic model is the limit case when  = 1 and  → ∞, and that the pure Poisson arrival model corresponds to the case when  = 0 and   0. Our goal is to demonstrate that the diffusion curve features an adoption plateau: there is a group of early adopters who purchase the new model right away, followed by no purchases at all for a while (plateau), followed by gradual purchases by late adopters.
For tractability, we assume that there is only one good, the durable, and that each agent has a lifetime budget  to spend on durables. 15 This model focuses exclusively on the intertemporal trade-off of purchasing the durable at different points in time, and excludes the possibility of an on-going substitution between the durable and other goods. Since we are primarily interested in the timing of durable purchases, this simplified specification seems appropriate. In many durable goods markets, the quality-adjusted price for the durable falls over time because of manufacturing efficiency improvements. Thus, we now also let the price of the durable fall exponentially over time:
With falling prices it may become attractive to buy a durable with delay: though its expected service flow decreases, the durable also becomes cheaper. The state variables for the consumer are  -the technological age of the endowed durable,   =     -the "purchasing power" of the consumer, and  -the time since the last arrival of a new model (i.e. the age of the current model). The law of motion for the purchasing power is
where, as before,   = 1 if a new durable is purchased at date  and   = 0 otherwise. Let   ¡   ¢ be a consumer's total discounted value of holding a purchasing power and a durable of technological age  at the moment when a time  has elapsed since the last arrival of a new model. We restrict attention to the case  = 1, so  ∈ {0 1}. This captures the main insights from the extended model without making the proofs excessively complicated.
When the new model reaches age , innovations start arriving at a constant Poisson rate  and  becomes uninformative about the time of the next arrival. Therefore, the value function ceases to depend on :
is the value of the service flow  0 until the next Poisson event and the continuation value of an old model afterwards:
For   ,
Every time a new model arrives, all existing durables depreciate. An agent with purchasing power chooses the delay  ¡¢ in purchasing the new model. It is convenient to distinguish between two cases:    and   , and separate the optimization problems over these intervals. Call the corresponding value functions  
¡¢
. Both of those value functions are measured at the point where  = 0. Then
and
The first term in the above expression is the value of holding the depreciated good until the new model reaches age , the second term is the expected value of holding the depreciated good between  and  and the third term is the expected value of the replacement at .
(Note here that when a new good is bought at the time when   , the corresponding continuation value of a new durable is as if it were of age .) The following proposition characterizes the optimal delay.
Proposition 3: Let  =  +  and let   0. Then there is an interval £  ¤ with 0 ≤     such that no durable purchases are made in the interval
Moreover, all consumers who can afford the new model either purchase it right away (when  = 0) or after date :
Proposition 3 illustrates how predictability of innovations affects the adoption timing. When  = 0 and the hazard rate of innovation is constant (i.e. arrival is unpredictable), demand for the durable stays positive from the time of innovation until the time when all consumers have purchased the current model. By contrast, when   0, demand for the durable falls to zero as the date of possible new arrivals (that is, date ) draws sufficiently close and stays at zero for some time after date . 16 In other words, early adopters act before time , no one adopts between  and, and late adopters postpone action until after timē . The no-purchase interval thus represents the flat part of the diffusion curve where the number of adopters stays constant over time. Figure 4 illustrates a typical diffusion curve that arises in this case. We investigate numerically whether the adoption plateaus are quantitatively important, especially when the price of the durable is falling. For the simulations, we choose parameter values that we think are representative of markets for high-tech products. If  0 and  1 are the service flows of the durables in a detrended model, then the corresponding absolute service flows are
is the relative advantage of a new model. We set  0 = 04 and  1 = 0, which corresponds to a new model providing 50 percent more service than old models. We perform simulations for two average design cycle lengths:  =  + 1 = {3 5} years. We set parameters  =  = 004 and experiment with different values of ,  and . Figure 5 shows our results. In each panel, purchase delay is on the vertical axis and  is on the horizontal axis. The average introduction time  is 3 years for the left panels and 5 years for the right panels, while  = 005 for the top panels and  = 012 for the bottom panels. Since in each panel the average introduction time is kept constant, as  varies,  needs to be adjusted accordingly. Let () =  − 1. This function is plotted as a thin solid line in each panel. The thick lines show the ends of the no-purchase interval,  () and  (). In all cases, () ≤ () ≤(). All three lines cross at  = 0, which corresponds to the case of pure Poisson arrival times.
Note that when  = 005,  = 0. When the average introduction time is 3 (top-left panel), note also that  3 for  ≥ 04. For those parameters, the time between new arrivals will often be shorter than. That is, the consumers who wanted to delay the purchase beyond  are frequently 'surprised' with a new arrival before the time when they were prepared to buy a new model. Obviously, when this happens, the consumers begin the new cycle with a higher purchasing power; and those with a high enough will buy the new model right away. That is, for some consumers, the surprise provokes an earlier purchase than what was 'scheduled'. In reality, then, the majority of the purchases will be perfectly synchronized with the arrivals of new models, as in the deterministic setting. When  = 012,  0 for high values of . Here, because prices are falling rapidly, some consumers are prepared to wait for a while after a new model arrives before purchasing it. So the initial purchase spike, produced by those consumers with  ¡¢ = 0, is followed by a period of positive demand (until ). Afterwards, demand drops to zero and purchases resume only if the period turns out to be sufficiently long.
Conclusion
We developed a model of durable goods that highlights the difference between obsolescence and physical wear and tear. The basic model is simple and it can be solved analytically. We identify predictable obsolescence as a distinct source of demand fluctuations, and explain how it affects the technology adoption decisions. The key implications of the basic model carry over to the case when obsolescence is stochastic and the relative price of the durable is falling. The stochastic model produces a diffusion curve with an adoption plateau, which is in contrast to the standard, S-shaped, logistical diffusion curve.
The model explains simultaneous adoption of new durables without relying on network effects or externalities. This result provides a new perspective on policies that are designed to encourage mass technology adoption (e.g., a subsidy for digital TV). What is more, our analysis explains why durable and non-durable consumption might respond to wealth and income shocks in non-standard ways. Specifically, in our model larger income shocks are going to reduce the volatility of durable demand but increase the volatility of non-durable demand. Also, the possibility to shift durable purchase timing in response to changes in wealth leads to an insulation effect for non-durable consumption. The above results may inform empirical studies of demand in markets where obsolescence cycles are important.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: If a consumer uses model  −  when the state-of-the art-model is  , her utility from durable consumption equals
Note that along the trajectory ( ()   ()), the model being consumed at time  is  () = bc − (), where bc denotes the integer part of . Thus, the total discounted utility for the
Arbitrarily, we can re-normalize utility to set  = 0 without changing the consumer's preferences over consumption paths.
Proof of Theorem 1: Suppose the agent is endowed with a durable of age  and follows an arbitrary purchasing policy  = {  } ∞ =1 . We first show that the total cost and value ( ) of policy  can be represented as a convex combination of the points {(     )}  +1
=1 . Let  0 = − and for all  ≥ 0, let   = min { +1 −     } be the "holding time" for the durable purchased at time   . Then
where the inequality is strict if for some
for  = 1      , and let
is a convex combination of the twodimensional vectors (     ). Note that when  =  ,   0 = 0 for all  0 . 17 We next deduce an optimal policy for the case where  =  (i.e., when the agent is endowed with a useless durable). If  ≥  1 , the agent can afford to replace the durable every period and   () =  1 (moreover, if    1 , it is not possible for the agent to spend the budget  in durables). For what follows assume that    1 . Let  and  *
for some nonnegative weights   adding to 1, we have that
To conclude, we only need to show that this bound is attained. For this we need to show that there exists a policy  such that P
Put differently, we need to show that there exists an -flexible rule with budget .
Assume that    and let  *  denote the set of budgets ( ) corresponding to policies  that are -flexible rules and satisfy  1 = 0 (that is,  makes a purchase in the first period). Let  be such a policy and  0 be its continuation policy from the period of the second purchase onward: 
is a fixed point of the above equation.
for all    +1 ,  is also the largest such fixed point, and thus  *
there exists a ( )-flexible rule (that spends the budget  exactly). The proof for  =  is similar (here   +1 = 0 and we must consider policies  where  +1 −     + 1 for some ).
Finally, observe that if ( ) is the initial state and  and are two ( )-flexible rules (they spend the same budget ), then their corresponding   (and 1 −   ) must coincide, and therefore they must have the same value as well. In particular, if  ∈ [ +1    ], then 17 For each  = 1     , we could define instead   = {  |  ∈ N and   = }, as we did in Section 3. Then,   = P ∈    . While   contains the purchase numbers,   contains the purchase periods of durables that are disposed at age . However, for other purposes, the set   is more convenient.
any -flexible rule that spends the budget  exactly is an optimal policy.
By construction, the value of following an ( )-flexible rule starting from a durable of age  is given by
When the endowed durable is of age   , the corresponding optimal value function   () can be deduced from   () from the observation that the continuation of an optimal policy is an optimal policy for the subproblem that arises in the second period after following the policy in the first period.
If starting with a budget
, a consumer buys a durable in the first period and then keeps it for the next −1 periods, her budget at the beginning of period
Assume that the initial state is ( ), where
Therefore, starting at state (), it is optimal to follow an -flexible rule. Assume she does so. Then, after  periods her state becomes ( ), and from state ( ) she must be following an -flexible rule as well. Hence, the agent must keep the durable for another  −  periods (at least). At that point, she arrives at state (  − ). Note that
Hence, if  − ∈ [ +1   +1+1 ) she must keep the durable this period and buy a new durable next period, so her continuation value is
she can optimally buy a new durable this period, and her continuation value is   ( − ). Therefore
, and
¢ , and tedious algebra shows again that
and 1 ≤   , and the claim would complete the proof. To prove our claim, we show that
That is, when     , the consumer strictly prefers to replace the durable immediately than to replace it at any later time. One can check that the above inequality holds when  =   . Also, since   is concave, the function   () has a higher slope than the function on the right hand side for any   0. Hence, the inequality holds for every     .
Proof of Theorem 2:
Consider an arbitrary purchasing policy
, where  
so that
The coefficient   incorporates the discounting of all the periods in which a purchase is made for a good that will be replaced at age . By contrast,   incorporates the discounting of all the periods in which a purchase is made to replace a good of age . The adjustment, reflected in the factor multiplying   0 , of   0 (and  0 ) is required to take into account the first purchase that replaces the endowed good (that in our accounting, was not previously purchased). Observe that for
where strict inequality holds when a useless good is not replaced for one or more periods). Thereforē
} be an arbitrary purchasing policy and ( ) be the weights defined by (17) . Then ( ) ∈ Γ. Conversely, for any ( ) ∈ Γ (and  0 1 ≥ 1), there exists a purchasing policy {( 0     )} that satisfies (17) . Though this policy is usually not unique, all such policies have the same budget and value. Thus, with abuse of notation we will also refer to a ( ) ∈ Γ as a purchasing policy.
The argument above essentially contains the proof of this claim. CLAIM 2: Suppose that the policy corresponds to an -flexible rule where  1 = 0 and the replacement of durables of age  + 1 is never delayed but the replacement of durables of age  is sometimes delayed. Then, the policy is suboptimal: there exists another -flexible rule without delays that costs the same and has a strictly higher value. 
So, as the delays increase (  increases), ( ) moves away of (), below the Pareto frontier. But, if    +1 , the delays may eventually take ( ) back above the Pareto frontier. This could happen only if    +1 . But even if every durable of age  is replaced with delay, the cost of the policy is more than replacing the durables at age  + 1 all the time. That is,  ≥  +1 . Therefore  +1 ≤  ≤   and     (), and there exists another -flexible rule with no delays that costs  and has value   ().
CLAIM 3: Suppose that the policy {(     )} is such that    0 for some . Then the policy is suboptimal: there exists another policy without delays that uses the same budget but has strictly higher value.
Assume that the policy has delays. We now recursively modify the policy by eliminating delays while maintaining the same budget and improving its value in every step. Let  =  1 +  2 ,  =    for  = 1 2, and 1 =  1 . Then For a fixed , the intervals corresponding to case 1 alternate with those corresponding to case 2. Moreover, collectively, they are mutually exclusive and cover the whole wealth range.
Proof of Proposition 2:
As argued in the text, gains from trade within the 1-flexible class are zero, leaving the 1-fixed class as the only candidate sellers of used goods. The proof proceeds in three steps.
Step 1 Derive the upper bound on the used good price acceptable by the buyer. A buyer is someone with  = 1, budget    11 ,  1 () =  1  and optimal non-durable consumption  1 . Instead of purchasing a new good right away, and following a 1-flexible rule afterwards, this consumer can purchase a used good of age  at price  () and follow a 1-flexible rule forever after. The flexible rule prescribes that the gain from trade is spent exclusively on durables. Hence, the buyer's lifetime utility from a used good purchased at age  is With no trade, her utility is 
